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THE TWO-FOLD TASK OF  
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Bruce Ellis Benson
Using Pierre Hadot’s idea of “philosophy as a way of life,” I argue that Chris-
tian philosophy of religion is ultimately about the practical task of living 
our lives. But I contend that this task is two-fold: it includes both theory and 
practice. While analytic philosophy of philosophy of religion (APR) tends to 
emphasize theory and continental philosophy of religion (CPR) tends to em-
phasize practice (admittedly, these generalizations are only true to a certain 
extent), APR and CPR are both part of a two-fold task. Throughout the paper, 
I put into question any hard distinction between theory and practice.
Introduction
In an article in The Chronicle of Higher Education with the somewhat men-
acing title “Making Philosophy Matter—Or Else,” Lee McIntyre argues 
that we philosophers have not always made it clear why what we do 
matters, and that recent threatened closures and actual closures of phi-
losophy departments should encourage us to think more about how to 
demonstrate that we do something of great importance.1 Now I am utterly 
convinced that our philosophical work does matter; I think what we do has 
deep implications for how we live life. But it is less clear to me exactly how 
best to articulate what it means for philosophy to matter. More important, 
my concern is particularly how Christian philosophy matters, and to whom 
it matters.
In what follows, I want to argue that Christian philosophy has a two-
fold task. On the one hand, philosophy is rightly thought of as first and 
foremost practical: this is true of all philosophy and it should be particu-
larly true of Christian philosophy. It is not just that our philosophy should 
have an effect on our lives; it is also the case that philosophy grows out of 
our lives in the first place. By “practical,” I simply mean: “concerned with 
action.” On the other hand, this emphasis on practical philosophy is in 
no way incompatible with what we might call “theoretical philosophy.” 
By “theoretical,” I mean: “concerned with thinking.” I will be working 
with these rather rough and ready definitions throughout my paper, but 
it will become apparent by the end that they are not quite as clear as they 
1Lee MacIntyre, “Making Philosophy Matter—Or Else,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
December 11, 2011.
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might seem to be. In any case, while it is true that theoretical philosophy 
can become (and sometimes does become) “academic” in the worst sense 
of that term—remote, obscure, and hermetic—it too can be seen as having 
the goal of living well. This is what I mean by the two-fold task of phi-
losophy as a practical pursuit and as a theoretical pursuit; it is one task that 
takes two forms. However, even these forms are such that they are not 
exclusive. Since it is well beyond the scope of this paper to consider phi-
losophy broadly construed, I will work this out in regard to philosophy 
of religion. More specifically, in sections two and three, I want to consider 
three criticisms of analytic philosophy of religion (APR) made by John D. 
Caputo, Richard Messer, and Nick Trakakis. These criticisms are: (1) that 
APR makes God into a definable object; (2) that APR is concerned with 
cognitive certainty; and (3) that APR is overly theoretical. The questions 
that I will ask are: First, are these claims correct and, if so, to what extent? 
Second, if there is some truth to these claims (particularly the last one), 
are APR and CPR (continental philosophy of religion) simply engaged in 
different tasks? Ultimately, my claim will be that practitioners of APR and 
CPR are actually engaged in one task that is two-fold.
Philosophy as a Way of Life
Before we can talk specifically about Christian philosophy, we need to 
consider how philosophy emerges. Socrates claims that philosophy be-
gins in thaumazein—awe or wonder: “This sense of wonder [thaumazein] 
is the mark of the philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin.”2 
It is a pity that the English term “awe” has, through colloquial overuse, 
lost so much of its force. For, right before this passage, Theaetetus has just 
said: “By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder [thaumazô] when I think 
of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my 
head swim.”3 Aristotle says the following: “For it is owing to their wonder 
that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they won-
dered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little 
and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena 
of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis 
of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself 
ignorant.”4 In the second section of this paper, I will turn to the question 
of the extent to which philosophy remains in thaumazein, as opposed to 
simply finding answers so that wonder ceases.
For the moment, let us consider what wonder causes us to do. I think 
it’s safe to say: ask questions. What sorts of questions are these? They are 
first and foremost questions about living life. Pierre Hadot (in such texts 
2Plato, Theaetetus 155d, in The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).
3Plato, Theaetetus 155c, quoted in Rosemary Desjardins, The Rational Enterprise: Logos in 
Plato’s Theaetetus (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1990), 189.
4Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b 12–17.
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as Philosophy as a Way of Life and What Is Ancient Philosophy?) has argued 
that ancient philosophers saw what they were doing as a complete way of 
life. More recently, John M. Cooper (in Pursuits of Wisdom) has taken up 
the same thesis and considerably broadened it. Both build what I take to 
be a convincing case that is was not just ethics and politics that were seen 
as “practical” for the ancients but that metaphysics, epistemology, logic, 
and physics were designed to be practical too.
Consider what Plutarch says about philosophy as something one does:
Most people imagine that philosophy consists in delivering discourses from 
the heights of a chair, and in giving classes based on texts. But what these 
people utterly miss is the uninterrupted philosophy which we see being 
practiced every day in a way which is perfectly equal to itself. . . . Socrates 
did not set up a grandstand for his audience and did not sit upon a professo-
rial chair; he had no fixed timetable for talking and walking with his friends. 
Rather, he did philosophy sometimes by joking with them, or by drinking 
or going to war or to the market with them, and finally by going to prison 
and drinking poison. He was the first to show that at all times and in every 
place, in everything that happens to us, daily life gives us the opportunity 
to do philosophy.5
The love of “sophia,” then, is not some kind of theoretical love, but a prac-
tical one. Philosophy is an activity in which we are constantly engaged. It 
does not end when we leave our offices at the end of the day.
How might we define this activity? Plato defines philosophy as training 
for death and Montaigne famously writes “that to philosophize is to learn 
to die.”6 One aspect of this training is that one is preparing for one’s own 
death. We might put this as follows: on your deathbed, what do you want 
your life to have looked like? Will you be able to say: “I have no regrets”? 
While the Christian view of the afterlife significantly re-contextualizes this 
insight, it in no way negates it: as one Christian monk noted, “since the 
beginning of our conversation, we have come closer to death. Let us be 
vigilant while we still have the time.”7 Yet this “death” can be taken in 
another way. Thaumazein opens our minds in such a way that we realize 
our own ignorance. When we are thus humbled—when we have “died” to 
intellectual pride—we are able to learn. We are no longer complacent. Of 
course, one might well ask at this point: if I am working on a technical ar-
gument or doing a careful investigation of, say, Book I of Plato’s Republic, 
in what sense am I training for death? My response: in both ways. First, 
5Plutarch, Whether a Man Should Engage in Politics When He is Old, quoted in Pierre Hadot, 
What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 38.
6Phaedo 62a: “Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves 
in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing for dying 
and death.” Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), chap. 20.
7Quoted in Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), 68.
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doing something more “technical” in nature is also part of living well, 
even if it simply expands one’s mind and gives one a better understanding 
of the nature of reality. Second, working on an argument usually is hum-
bling, for it tends to involve frustration with initial attempts and it may 
require the “death” of giving up cherished beliefs. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
puts this as follows:
The scholar never fully knows in advance where his line of thought will lead 
him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course 
of action that may lead him into the painful process of revising his actual 
Christian commitment, sorting through his beliefs, and discarding some 
from a position where they can any longer function as control [beliefs].8
While Wolterstorff is specifically talking about research that may disturb 
Christian beliefs, there are many other beliefs that our work as philoso-
phers may disturb.
Now, if we combine this idea of training for death with dying with 
Christ—so not just a literal death but also death to our sinful selves—the 
idea becomes even more profound. In Mark 8:35, Jesus tells us that “those 
who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my 
sake, and the sake of the gospel, will save it.” Paul talks about being dead 
to sin (Rm. 6:2) and being dead to one’s sinful self (Gal. 2:20). The Chris-
tian notion of “conversion” (metanoia) is that of a fundamental, 180-degree 
reorientation of the self. It is nothing short of a movement in which we 
become different persons and thus die to self.
Something like this idea of conversion is actually to be found in an-
cient philosophy. Hadot reminds us of the prominent place that askêsis 
plays in ancient philosophy. While the term askêsis is often rendered as 
“asceticism,” it is much better rendered as “spiritual exercises” that con-
cern both body and soul. They are designed so that we (to quote Hadot) 
“let ourselves be changed, in our point of view, attitudes, and convictions. 
This means that we must dialogue with ourselves, hence do battle with 
ourselves.”9 According to Hadot, the goal of askêsis is to bring about “a 
conversion which turns our entire life upside down, changing the life of 
the person who goes through it.”10 So metanoia and askêsis end up being 
remarkably similar, with one important caveat: metanoia is not something 
that we can accomplish by ourselves. Of course, exactly how one works 
this out is going to depend on one’s theology of the Holy Spirit. And this 
project of dying to a certain self is one that can be found, for instance, 
in Nietzsche, who takes philosophy to be fundamentally about self-over-
coming. Specifically, he speaks of “life that cuts into life.”11 Nietzsche’s 
8Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion Alone, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 96.
9Ibid., 91.
10Ibid., 83.
11Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954), II.8.
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philosophy, then, should be read as part of the ascetic tradition.12 In this 
sense, Nietzsche is engaged in dying to self, in ways that are both Socratic 
and Pauline, even though I think it is ultimately a failed project.
While Christians tend to think that spiritual exercises or disciplines 
are something unique to Christianity, the reality is that such disciplines 
long predate its advent. Thus, early Christians imported such disciplines 
from pagan philosophy and Judaism, adapting them for distinctively 
Christian ends. Further, as Christianity was trying to find its own identity, 
second-century Apologists such as Justin Martyr and Clement of Alex-
andria explicitly positioned Christianity as a competing philosophy—not 
just any philosophy but the true philosophy that had been prefigured by 
earlier philosophers. And that emphasis continued with such thinkers as 
Origen, the Cappodocian Fathers, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, 
and Gregory of Nyssa. It is also to be found in John Chrysostom, who 
works out askêsis in the following way: he encourages those wishing to 
follow the way of Christian faith to consider their souls to be like paint-
ings or pieces of sculpture. We are the works of art that God has created, 
though God gives us the great honor of further fashioning ourselves. Of 
course, we do not do so all by ourselves; indeed, Saint Chrysostom exhorts 
parents to be part of the process with their children. By extension, all of us 
in Christian community are part of helping fashion one another to become 
beautiful works of art.
Practically, though, what does the askêsis that develops us as living works 
of art involve? Consider the following list of activities that Hadot provides: 
research, investigation, reading, listening, attention, and self-mastery.13 The 
most important of these categories is that of “attention” or self-awareness. 
What the Stoics called “prosoche” (attention) “supposes that, at each instant, 
we renew our choice of life . . . and that we keep constantly present in our 
minds the rules of life which express that choice.”14 The goal here is to be 
aware of what one is doing—one’s actions, one’s thoughts, one’s motiva-
tions—and thus constantly aware of whom one is becoming. Given that 
Paul exhorts us not to be “conformed to this world” but instead to “be 
transformed” (Rm. 12:2), such attention is surely appropriate. Under the 
category of listening, we could place both prayer and meditation. When we 
engage in meditation, we allow God to speak to us, as well as to ruminate 
upon Christian teachings about how we ought to live. For the Stoics, medi-
tation involves remembering and even memorizing key maxims, dwelling 
upon them, and seeing how they can be put into practice. The point of 
meditation is to transform both thinking and practice. Indeed, Saint Paul 
calls us to think on those things that will lift up our gaze and our lives: 
“Whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is 
12Bruce Ellis Benson makes this point in Pious Nietzsche: Decadence and Dionysian Faith 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), chap. 9.
13Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 84. 
14Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? 193.
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pure, whatever is pleasing, whatever is commendable, if there is any excel-
lence and if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things” 
(Ph. 4:8). Then he goes on to connect these meditations to practice: “Keep 
on doing the things that you have learned and received and heard and 
seen in me, and the God of peace will be with you” (Ph. 4:9). Research, 
investigation, and reading all involve immersing ourselves in the truths of 
the Christian faith and considering how those truths should practically be 
expressed. Reading Scripture is clearly central to a distinctively Christian 
askêsis, but so is reading theology or classic Christian texts. But this is also 
what philosophers do: we read philosophical texts, we advance arguments, 
and we give papers at conferences. This is all part of our philosophical 
askêsis. Hadot reminds us that these spiritual exercises are not merely per-
sonal. The Socratic dialogues are about putting the interlocutors through a 
rigorous examination. In other words, the topic is not merely some point 
of belief (though it is certainly that too); it is also the very interlocutors 
themselves. Consider Socrates’s rebuke to the Athenian senate:
My very good friend, you are an Athenian and belong to a city which is the 
greatest and most famous in the world for its wisdom and strength. Are you 
not ashamed that you give your attention to acquiring as much money as 
possible, and similarly with reputation and honour, and give no attention or 
thought to truth [aletheia] and understanding [phronesis] and the perfection 
of your soul?15
One could easily imagine such a claim from a Christian theologian or 
someone writing on living the Christian life. Socrates makes a claim about 
what is really important in life that is remarkably similar to what Chris-
tians would say.
Of course, I could also imagine someone at this point wondering if the 
way I’ve been describing ancient philosophy is almost the kind of thing 
you’d find in the “Self-Help” section of your local bookstore (if you’re 
lucky enough to still have one). Where, one might ask, is the philosophy—
or the “beef,” if you’re old enough to remember that ad campaign? I think 
there are two responses. One goes as follows: precisely because we have 
generally lost sight of this vision of what philosophy looks like, we may 
be inclined to think something along the lines of “but this isn’t real phi-
losophy.” That is, we are largely conditioned to think that philosophy 
is a kind of scientific endeavor. In contrast, what we’ve been looking at 
seems more like an artistic endeavor. But, again, that kind of response 
is very much conditioned by a certain viewpoint that has developed in 
contemporary philosophy. At the beginning of Hadot’s What is Ancient 
Philosophy?, he quotes Kant, who writes: “The ancient Greek philosophers, 
such as Epicurus, Zeno, and Socrates, remained more faithful to the Idea 
of the philosopher than their modern counterparts have done. ‘When will 
you finally begin to live virtuously,’ said Plato to an old man who told him 
15Apology 29d–e
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he was attending classes on virtue. The point is not always to speculate, 
but also ultimately to think about applying our knowledge.”16 Here Kant 
recognizes that, already in his time, this idea of the philosopher (that is, 
the one who applies her knowledge) had been lost—or nearly so.
But another way of responding to the objection that this is not real phi-
losophy is by pointing to centrality of argument and reason within this 
tradition, albeit with a twist. In The Therapy of Desire, Martha Nussbaum 
writes that
Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics—all conceived of philosophy as a way of 
addressing the most painful problems of human life. They saw the philoso-
pher as a compassionate physician whose arts could heal many pervasive 
types of human suffering. They practiced philosophy not as a detached 
intellectual technique dedicated to the display of cleverness but as an im-
mersed and worldly art of grappling with human misery.
She goes on to say:
These philosophers were still very much philosophers—dedicated to the 
careful argumentation, the explicitness, the comprehensiveness, and the 
rigor that have usually been sought by philosophy, in the tradition of ethical 
reflection that takes its start (in the west) with Socrates. . . . On the other hand, 
their intense focus on the state of desire and thought in the pupil made them 
seek a newly complex understanding of human psychology, and led them to 
adopt complex strategies—interactive, rhetorical, literary—designed to en-
able them to grapple more effectively with what they had understood. In the 
process they forge new conceptions of what philosophical rigor and preci-
sion require. In these ways Hellenistic ethics is unlike the more detached 
and academic philosophy that has sometimes been practiced in the Western 
tradition.17
But here we see that things get complicated. On the one hand, the Epicu-
reans, Skeptics, and Stoics are still engaging in philosophy and operating 
according to standards of rigor and precision. They are philosophers, after 
all. On the other hand, their very practical concerns mean that philosophy 
for them is not narrowly conceived. It also uses techniques that seem (at 
least to many of us) more artistic than scientific.
Nussbaum fleshes out these differences by examining what she terms 
“the medical model of philosophizing.” Since the Hellenistic philoso-
phers are concerned with health of the soul, they realize that the entire 
enterprise is person-related. Whereas physics might perhaps proceed in 
a purely detached manner (and this is surely a contestable claim), ethics 
cannot. We are not interested in (as she puts it), “standing on the rim of 
heaven” to find out about the truths of one’s life.
16Immanuel Kant, Lectures on the Philosophical Encyclopedia. Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 
29, Abt. 4.1.1, Vorlesungen. Kleine Vorlesungen und Ergaenzungen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980), 9 
and 12.
17Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3–4.
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At this point, we can make what I take to be an important connection 
between these Hellenistic philosophers and Aristotle. Consider what 
Epicurus says: “Philosophy is an activity that secures the flourishing 
[eudaimōn] life by arguments and reasonings.”18 Clearly, the kinds of argu-
ments and reasonings that Epicurus has in mind are more concerned with 
practical wisdom, the usual translation of phronesis in Aristotle. And here 
it is helpful to consider Aristotle’s distinction between, on the one hand, 
phronesis or praxis and, on the other hand, sophia or theoria. Phronesis is 
three-fold for Aristotle. It is the ability (1) to know what is important, (2) 
to know how to bring that important thing about, and (3) actually to do 
so. Anything short of right action is not true phronesis. Given this emphasis 
on action, phronesis is concerned with specific and concrete truths. For in-
stance, in the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle talks about “what is fitting . . . 
in relation to the agent, and to the circumstances and the object.”19 How 
should I live my life? While there is a universal and unchanging component 
in the answer to this question (for Aristotle is going to say that the virtues 
of temperance and courage do not change), they still need to be concret-
ized not only in a specific person’s life but also in a specific person’s action. 
By way of phronesis, we are able to acquire moral virtue, which Aristotle 
ultimately thinks is closely connected to political knowledge.20 In contrast, 
sophia—theoretical reason—is not necessarily connected with action. What 
sophia gets us, instead, is knowledge of that which does not change, uni-
versal truths. It arrives at something we normally call “science.”
But here is where things start to get interesting. For Aristotle compli-
cates the sophia/phronesis distinction in (at least) two ways. First, while it 
is clear that the intellectual virtues are ultimately higher than the prac-
tical virtues, the practical ones are needed as part of the whole package. 
A way of putting this is that the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues 
complement one another, so that they are both needed for one to be truly 
virtuous. A more powerful way of putting it, though, is by saying that 
wisdom and happiness of the highest sort requires both, since phronesis is 
more basic and so is indispensible to sophia. This is an insight that turns 
out to be key for Martin Heidegger, and it is connected to his study of 
Aristotle. On the way to Being and Time, Heidegger lectured repeatedly 
on Aristotle while at the University of Marburg. In a course on Plato’s 
Sophist, Heidegger devotes a large portion of his lectures to book six of 
the Nichomachean Ethics, paying special attention to phronesis.21 By the time 
of Being and Time, he writes that “knowing the world” (which Heidegger 
18Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 11.169.
19Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1122a 25–26. I am using the translation (by W. D. Ross, 
revised by J. O. Urmson) found in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
20John Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to 
Plotinus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 72.
21Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), chap. 1.
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equates with the “knowing” of the natural sciences) is a “founded mode” 
of our relation to the world.22 In other words, we first encounter the world 
in the practical way of “living in it” and then we theorize about the world. 
Phronesis provides us with the “for which” and “the how.” While Hei-
degger never uses the term phronesis, one can find this idea in his uses 
of Umsicht (circumspection), Verstehen (understanding), Entschlossenheit 
(resoluteness), and Gewissen (conscience).23 So phronesis is central to the 
most basic form of human existence, which means that theoria is depen-
dent upon it. We find a similar idea in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception: namely, that our everyday, practical embodiment in the world 
is the basis for any scientific or philosophical claims.
There is a second complication. Cooper speaks of “philosophy as two 
ways of life” in regard to Aristotle. On the one hand, it is clear that the 
happiest life for Aristotle is the contemplative one. Of course, Cooper 
makes the point that I made earlier, namely that even contemplatives are 
engaging in the practical virtues in their daily lives. But then he goes on to 
say that “this life [the contemplative life] also includes the best and most 
end-like virtues, the virtues of theoretical wisdom and understanding, 
together with the active employment of these virtues on the highest and 
best objects of knowledge, the divine entities that are the first principles 
of all reality.”24 So that is one way of life that suits the philosopher: the life 
of contemplation. In contrast, the second kind of philosopher is actively 
engaged in human affairs. For Aristotle, this person may be involved in 
politics or may be simply an ordinary person. What distinguishes these 
folks is that (again, to cite Cooper) “their philosophy consists in practical 
understanding and knowing, and the proper exercise of that philosophical 
knowledge is in the discriminating evaluative thinking that goes into and 
informs each and every virtuous action making up their fully virtuous 
lives.”25 In other words, one can do philosophy by engaging in daily affairs 
in a philosophically thoughtful way, even though there may well be some 
contemplation in this philosophical way of life too.26 As we will see moving 
forward, it may well be the case that only by integrating both of these di-
mensions to philosophy can Christian philosophy be fully Christian.
APR and CPR on Thaumazein
So far, we have talked about thaumazein and the differences between prac-
tical and theoretical philosophy. In this section, I want to consider how 
22Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1962), ¶ 13.
23For more on this point, see Robert Bernasconi’s discussion in “Heidegger’s Destruction 
of Phronesis,” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1989), 127–147.
24Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom, 138.
25Ibid., 143.
26Aristotle makes it clear that the statesman also engages in theoria. My thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for this point.
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APR and CPR relate to thaumazein; in the next section, I will consider how 
they relate to practical and theoretical philosophy.
Earlier, we noted that philosophy begins in awe or wonder. As such, 
it generates—at least for Socrates—aporia. At one point, Meno accuses 
Socrates of being like a stingray by perplexing his interlocutors. Socrates 
responds by saying: “It isn’t that, knowing the answers myself, I perplex 
other people. The truth is rather that I infect them also with the perplexity 
I feel myself. So it is with virtue now. I don’t know what it is.”27 Elsewhere, 
Socrates describes himself precisely in terms of perplexity: he says, “I am 
utterly disturbing [atopos] and I create only perplexity [aporia].”28 To be 
atopos is literally to be “out of place.” And this is what Socrates is in Athens: 
he is “strange, extravagant, absurd, unclassifiable, and disconcerting” (to 
cite Hadot).29 Yet achieving this state of being atopos and having a sense of 
aporia is part of the very point of the dialogues. It is not the only point—for 
one wants to actually reach knowledge—but it is not simply accidental 
either.
What I am suggesting here is that philosophy is a way of life that works 
by way of an askêsis that leads us both to knowledge and to aporia. Aporia 
is central to the idea of Socratic ignorance. If we assume that we already 
know something, it is impossible to learn it: for we already know. In con-
trast, to ask is to admit that one does not know. As Hans-Georg Gadamer 
puts it, “discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that 
thing be broken open by the question. . . . To ask a question means to 
bring into the open.”30 So no new knowledge is possible if we insist that 
we already know. And learning to see our blind spots is actually quite dif-
ficult: it is part of the askêsis of knowing and questioning ourselves, and it 
involves a kind of dying to self.
Of course, it is not as if philosophy—or any other kind of thinking, for 
that matter—simply leads us onward and upward to ever more knowl-
edge. Here we need to be quite clear about what this aporia really is. The 
Greek word poros means “a way,” either literally or figuratively. With the 
addition of the alpha privative, it means simply “without a way.” In other 
words, to reach a point of aporia is to be at a point where it seems like 
one can go no further. This can be worked out in two different ways. One 
is simply that we cannot go any further. Christian philosophers may not 
always agree as to exactly where this point lies, but the nature of God and 
the fact that we are created, finite beings mean that there are such limits 
in talking about God. Or to put this problem in a more general way: we 
27Plato, Meno 80c.
28Theaetetus 149a. This is Hadot’s translation. For comparison, John McDowell translates 
this as: “What they do say is that I’m very odd, and that I make people feel difficulties.” 
Cornford translates it as: “the ignorant world describes me in other terms as an eccentric 
person who reduces people to hopeless perplexity.”
29Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 158.
30Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev ed., trans Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989), 363.
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always recognize—or at least we do if we are paying attention—that our 
attempts to answer questions are imperfect and incomplete. The more we 
understand the issue, the more we come to see our limitations.
What is at issue here is the possibility of “getting things right.” Richard 
Rorty infamously said that we should abandon the project of “getting 
things right,” but I think most analytic and continental philosophers agree 
that we cannot and ought not to give up on this project. Even Nietzsche 
does not give up on this project. Although he is often cited as some sort of 
“relativistic perspectivist,” this is a significant misunderstanding. While 
Nietzsche realizes that we all have hermeneutical lenses, he thinks that 
some perspectives are actually truer than others (precisely in terms of 
“getting things right”). Nietzsche can correctly be said to have given up 
seeking for the view from nowhere, but I take it that most philosophers 
have given that project up by now. As Merold Westphal points out, “we 
are all postmoderns now.”31 I could work this out in various ways, but let 
me limit myself to the notion of “violence.” Emmanuel Levinas, for in-
stance, worries that our efforts to do justice to the Other—whether human 
or divine—are inadequate. To put this as simply as possible: Levinas be-
lieves that, despite our best efforts to understand the Other aright, we do 
violence to the Other by reducing her to categories of our own making. 
For Levinas, this is a general concern, but let me give a specific example 
of what Levinas is worried about—namely, what I am doing right now in 
this paper. I am trying to speak meaningfully of APR and CPR, but my 
efforts (even with appropriate qualifications) are inevitably going to fall 
short. For neither is a monolithic whole, and so even talking about them 
as “tendencies” or “general ways of operating” is still problematic. But 
I don’t know how else to present this paper about general tendencies in 
APR and CPR without doing a certain kind of violence to each.
This concern for doing violence to the Other is central to much of con-
temporary CPR, and for good reason. For CPR, as it currently stands, 
has been deeply shaped by the critique of onto-theology. What is onto-
theology? Succinctly put, it is a form of metaphysics that allows God to 
be possible only according to the conceptual claims of philosophical dis-
course. The god of onto-theology is a philosophical creation akin to the 
causa sui, the ens realissimum, or “the god of the philosophers.” Heidegger 
puts this as follows: “metaphysics is theology, a statement about God, 
because the deity enters into philosophy.”32 But one might ask: what’s 
wrong with that? The problem is that (again to cite Heidegger) “the deity 
[as causa sui] can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its 
own accord and by its own nature, requires and determines that and how 
31Merold Westphal, “Must Phenomenology and Theology Make Two? A Response to 
Trakakis and Simmons,” Heythrop Journal 55 (2014), 711. This is Westphal’s reworking of 
Robert Brandom’s claim that “we are all Gadamerians now.”
32Martin Heidegger, “The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and 
Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 55. 
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the deity enters into it.”33 The result is that the “god” of onto-theology 
is no more than an idol, a creation of human thought used for our own 
purposes. Heidegger points out that “before the causa sui, man can neither 
fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god.”34
Assuming one believes that onto-theology really is a problem—which 
is a typical belief among practitioners of CPR—one can proceed in dif-
ferent ways. Jean-Luc Marion clearly thinks it is and employs at least three 
strategies to escape. First, he affirms Nietzsche’s death of god, arguing 
that the god who dies for Nietzsche is actually “the god of the philoso-
phers” and not “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.” Second, drawing 
on Christian apophatic traditions (which emphasize what we cannot say 
about God), he suggests that we think of God as “beyond being.”35 Third, 
he describes Christ as the “saturated phenomenon,” whose appearance 
to us is like that in Luke 9:29 in which Peter, James, and John see Christ 
in his glory and are overwhelmed. A somewhat different strategy can be 
found in Merold Westphal, who claims that the difference is not so much 
about whether we can say anything about God but one of how one says 
it. He claims that onto-theology “does not discredit theistic discourse as 
such. . . . It only discredits certain forms that discourse can/has take(n).”36 
I believe that Westphal is right on this matter.
But this raises a question: are practitioners of CPR really more attuned 
to violence done, say, to the idea of God than are practitioners of APR? 
Here’s one answer to this question. In his book Does God’s Existence Need 
Proof? Richard Messer claims that Richard Swinburne’s conception of God 
“is the dominant conception of God in traditional philosophy of religion.” 
Indeed, he goes on to say that this conception “is one which could be found 
with few variations in almost any introductory text in the philosophy of 
religion written in the recent Anglo-American academic environment.”37 
Messer claims that this conception includes such aspects that (1) God is 
definable; (2) God is an object; and (3) God is comprehensible. For this 
first point, he cites Swinburne as saying that God is “something like a 
‘person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do any-
thing, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper object of human 
worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe.’”38 For 
the second point, he cites Swinburne as saying that “God is something of 
which properties are true, which causally interacts with other recognizable 
observable objects . . . and therefore on any natural meaning of ‘object,’ 
33Ibid., 56.
34Ibid. 
35Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991). 
36Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 22.
37Richard Messer, Does God’s Existence Need Proof? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 18.
38Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 1.
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God is an object.”39 As to the third point, Messer does not cite Swinburne 
specifically to say that God is comprehensible, but thinks that this point 
in Swinburne is clear enough. It is important to note that Messer is not a 
practitioner of CPR but is instead a follower of D. Z. Philips, a follower of 
Wittengenstein. In opposition to this conception of God, Messer argues 
that God is inexpressible, is not a being, and is not an object. Although 
Messer does not use this language, the charge is essentially that Swin-
burne puts forth a conception of God that sounds very onto-theological. 
It is also a conception that Messer thinks is closely connected to proofs for 
God’s existence. Nick Trakakis explicitly picks up on this critique and, fol-
lowing Messer, argues that (1) God is wholly other; (2) God is not a being; 
and (3) God is “a concrete, not abstract, reality.”40 In describing God in this 
fashion, Trakakis is explicitly following John D. Caputo, who likewise (as 
we will see shortly) thinks there is no place for proofs for God’s existence.41
Assuming that Messer gets Swinburne right,42 to what extent is Messer’s 
claim that Swinburne’s view of God is the predominant view in APR true? 
Here things get complicated. For we can probably say that there are prac-
titioners of APR who have a view like or similar to that of Swinburne. 
However, APR is simply too varied to conclude that Swinburne’s view is 
true of all of APR or even paradigmatic for APR. Moreover, even these 
designations used by Trakakis are not completely clear on their own. I as-
sume that practitioners of APR and CPR can agree that God is not a being 
in the sense that humans are beings. In other words, even if we can say that 
God is some sort of being, it is surely clear that God’s “beingness” is quite 
significantly different from the “beingness” of other beings. Yet, if God is 
really wholly other, then one wonders what can be said of God at all.
Let me leave this question at this point and move to what I think is 
at stake here. Wherever one stands on what can be said of God, it has 
much to do with the extent to which philosophy remains connected to 
thaumazein, as opposed to wonder simply disappearing. Aristotle claims 
that, while theoria begins with awe, it “must end in something which is 
the opposite of our original inquiries.”43 So the goal is to do away with 
thaumazein and replace it with theoria. We no longer wonder once we are 
able to explain phenomena in terms of first principles and highest causes, 
since to comprehend something’s archē and to possess its aitia is to be able 
to explain it. To what extent philosophers can know anything in this way 
39Messer, Does God’s Existence Need Proof?, 21n54. 
40Nick Trakakis, The End of Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2008), 63–65.
41I am not interested in taking a stand one way or the other on this matter. In other words, 
Messer could be right about Swinburne and yet, if Westphal is right about onto-theology, the 
apologetic enterprise might be misguided, but not necessarily because it affirms false claims 
about God.
42I am assuming here that Messer’s read of Swinburne is correct and that many practitio-
ners of APR would likewise agree. Whether his read may be too narrow or in some other way 
problematic is a question I set to the side.
43Aristotle, Metaphysics 983a.
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is certainly up for debate. But, clearly, Christian philosophers cannot and 
should not claim to possess such absolute knowledge about God. In Rom. 
11:33–36, Paul writes:
O the depths of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How un-
searchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!
“For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his coun-
selor?”
“Or who has given a gift to him, to receive a gift in return?”
For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be the glory 
for ever. Amen.
Of course, merely quoting this piece of Scripture hardly solves anything. 
For we can agree that God cannot be fully known and still disagree (quite 
strongly) as to how just how far our knowledge of God actually goes. After 
all, the Christian tradition has hardly been unified over the past two mil-
lennia on this point.
In The New Phenomenology, J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis Benson 
speak of two tendencies, kataphatic excess and apophatic excess. On the 
one hand, practitioners of CPR are sometimes (maybe often—I leave this 
question open) too deflationary about what can be said of God. The worry 
here is that we become so obsessed with the limits of human reason, the 
fact that we are historically and culturally situated, and the overwhelming 
nature of God that we reduce discourse about God to the barest minimum. 
With this worry in mind, we proclaim that God cannot be properly known 
by human beings and thus we must say very little about God. This is the 
tendency of the apophatic tradition in theology and philosophy. On the 
other hand, practitioners of APR sometimes (maybe often—again, I leave 
this open) claim more about God than can rightly be maintained given 
human finitude and divine infinitude and, more important, the utter dif-
ference between creator and creation. Swinburne, again, is probably an 
example of this trend. We can become very confident in the powers of 
human reason, which leads to a strong kataphatic tradition that is overly 
confident about the ability of God-talk to map onto who God truly is. This 
latter tendency is often correlated with modernity, which generally exalts 
the powers of human reason (despite Kant’s project of Kritik); the former 
tendency is often correlated with postmodernity, which tends to see the 
modern project (assuming one can even speak in such a way) as both hu-
bristic and a failure. Either way, though, there is room for arrogance both 
in claiming too much about God and also in claiming that “those other 
people” are claiming too much. We might call these tendencies, respec-
tively, “inflationary arrogance” and “deflationary arrogance.” As it turns 
out, arrogance is an equal opportunity employer.
We could lament this situation, or we could see it for the blessing that 
it really is. If I am correct that APR and CPR represent tendencies toward 
inflation and deflation, respectively, then they can actually be seen as 
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complementary and part of the two-fold task of philosophy. It is certainly 
important for philosophers to make claims about God, but it is equally 
important for philosophers to challenge those claims. For lack of better 
terminology, we might say that we need both “constructive” and “critical” 
philosophy. Both have their value; both are dangerous if left unchecked by 
the other. The first can end up creating cults; the second can bring about 
a dangerous skepticism. Perhaps it goes without saying that, if you tend 
toward being a constructor, you will think that critical philosophers are 
particularly dangerous. But those who tend toward critical philosophy 
will think that those engaging exclusively in constructive philosophy are 
likewise dangerous.
APR and CPR on the Two-fold Task
For reasons of simplicity and clarity, I have put my comments on how one’s 
take on thaumazein affects one’s philosophy in the previous section. (Just to 
be clear, one does not have to know that “one has a take on thaumazein” in 
order to have one.) Here I want to address the two-fold task of philosophy 
in regard to Aristotle’s two ways of philosophical life—the contemplative 
and the active. Let me begin with the second of these ways of life: the life 
of the active philosopher.
In 1973, over a decade before Plantinga published his “Advice to Chris-
tian Philosophers,” Westphal published an essay aimed at giving advice 
specifically to Christian philosophers of religion. Obviously, Westphal 
could not have read Plantinga’s essay; I don’t know if Plantinga had read 
Westphal’s essay when he published his own. In any case, Westphal’s 
essay has not received nearly the attention that it deserves. It is titled 
(and this is quite a mouthful) “Prolegomena to any Future Philosophy of 
Religion which will be able to Come Forth as Prophecy.” There he specu-
lates (it was 1973, of course) that philosophy of religion should become 
“prophetic” in nature, by which he means it should be “personal, untimely, 
political, and eschatological.”44 By eschatological, he means that it should 
point to the future. By political, he means that it should not be afraid to 
confront political structures. By untimely, he means the following: “Pro-
phetic speech is conspicuously out of step with the spirit of the times. It is 
always minority speech.” By personal, he means that it is not like scientific 
discourse, for “it comes in the mode of direct address.”45 I think we can say 
that CPR is often written in these ways. Certainly Westphal’s own work 
takes this form.
This commitment to praxis would mean that subjectivity is essential to 
philosophical discourse. That would be the personal quality that Westphal 
mentions. For reasons of space, I will consider this personal aspect and 
how it connects to the untimely aspect, leaving the other two for another 
44Merold Westphal, “Prolegomena to any Future Philosophy of Religion which will be 
able to Come Forth as Prophecy,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1973), 141.
45Ibid., 144, 141.
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occasion. So to what extent does CPR exhibit these personal and untimely 
qualities? There are different places where one could begin to mount such 
a case. One could start with Kierkegaard. Whatever else Kierkegaard’s 
writings are, they are clearly personal in the sense of being edifying. 
Kierkegaard actually has a text titled Edifying (or Upbuilding) Discourses, 
but his entire corpus is really about edification. He writes on love, reli-
gious belief, sin, character development, and other phenomena that get 
right to the heart of daily human existence. Kierkegaard is very clear that 
he wants the reader to be changed by his texts. He does not simply want a 
change of mind, but a change of heart and a change in one’s action. It is not 
insignificant that he believes the classic proofs for God’s existence do not 
lead to belief in God and instead inspire doubt. His work is also untimely. 
One can point to the fact that he was not all that well received in his life-
time and, even today, he still is somewhat of an “outsider” in philosophy 
in the sense that many philosophers do not know quite what to make of 
him.46 His “existential” argument for belief in God is highly convincing to 
some, but perplexing to others.
We could make the same kind of case with Nietzsche. Although Ni-
etzsche is usually read as an atheist, I have argued elsewhere that he is a 
kind of Dionysian theist. In any case, Nietzsche is also an edifying philos-
opher. Perhaps his works are not as “upbuilding” as those of Kierkegaard, 
but they are certainly life-changing. As to his work being untimely, I think 
this is so obvious as to need no further clarification. While Nietzsche may 
have won a spot in the standard ethical theory course, his arguments still 
come across to many as, one might say, unusual. And I think one could—
mutatis mutandis—make a similar case for the likes of Heidegger, Levinas, 
Derrida, Marion, and Jean-Louis Chrétien. Their writing is, in my estima-
tion, moving and personal, even when it is sometimes written in a very 
difficult fashion. Further, having taught texts by these authors for over 
twenty years, I have watched as students have been transformed not just in 
their minds but in their behavior by reading them. Even if one ultimately 
comes to disagree with, say, Levinas, it is hard to have gone through the 
experience of reading his texts without becoming more concerned for the 
Other. And, without going into detail here, I think it would not be difficult 
to make the case that each has been “untimely” in significant ways. The 
appearance of Being and Time came as a shock to the way philosophy was 
then being done in Germany. Philosophers in France did not know what 
to make of Levinas. Derrida never received the honor of teaching at the 
Sorbonne (though he did teach at the still quite prestigious École Nor-
male Supérieur) and his reception in the English-speaking world has been 
primarily in departments other than philosophy. Marion is probably the 
leading philosopher in France today, but his Christian commitment is in 
stark contrast to the general atheistic cultural atmosphere in France. And 
46I borrow this notion of “outsider” from Diogenes Allen’s book Three Outsiders: Pascal, 
Kierkegaard, Simone Weil (Cambridge, MA: Cowley, 1983).
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Chrétien, who became a Christian after taking up his post at the Sorbonne, 
writes in a way that is hard to classify as offering a “philosophical argu-
ment.”
This idea that philosophy of religion should be prophetic is taken up 
by Caputo, who tells us that “the poetics of the Kingdom is prophetic—a 
diction of contradiction and interdiction—that ‘calls for’ (prophetein) the 
rule of God, calls for things to happen in God’s way, not the world’s.”47 I 
have no idea if Caputo had read Merold’s essay and said “by golly, that’s 
it” (or, more likely, “oui, oui, amen”). I think it is safe to say that Caputo 
understands philosophy as a way of life. But I think it is instructive to see 
what this means for him and his vision of CPR.
The talk about God and religion in contemporary continental philosophy 
bears almost no resemblance to what passes for traditional “philosophy of 
religion.” The latter has typically concerned itself with offering proofs for 
the immortality of the soul and for the existence of God, and with identify-
ing and analyzing the divine attributes. This tradition, which goes back to 
the scholastic debates of the high middle ages, is largely perpetuated today 
in the works of contemporary Anglo-American philosophers, who offer the 
old wine of metaphysical theology in the new bottles of analytic philosophy. 
Richard Swinburne alone can fill a blackboard with the symbolic logic of 
his proofs. All over Anglo-America, logicians and epistemologists, from the 
Dutch Reformed to the Roman Catholic confessions, hasten to stretch a net 
of argumentation under faith in the divine being, lest the leap of faith end 
up falling to the floor in a great crash.48
The reference to Swinburne is clear enough. The mention of the Dutch 
Reformed could refer to a number of people, though Alvin Plantinga is 
a probable candidate. As to “the Roman Catholic confessions,” it’s really 
hard to know exactly who is being included. However, I think we can 
safely say that APR has put considerably more emphasis on arguments for 
God’s existence than has CPR. One reason for this is that continental phi-
losophy in general has been less concerned about certainty and proof than 
has analytic philosophy. A good example of what I mean is Gadamer’s 
Truth and Method. Instead of asking whether we can know (or how can we 
know that we know?), Gadamer simply assumes that we can know and 
then asks: how does this take place? Both are epistemological concerns, but 
the emphasis is different. Further, it’s true that APR has been concerned 
with considering the attributes of God, but I think one can argue that 
Marion is doing something like this in God without Being (albeit in a rather 
modest way) and that Jean-Louis Chrétien considers the nature of God, 
for instance by way of the call and response.
47John D. Caputo, “The Poetics of the Impossible and the Kingdom of God,” in Rethinking 
Philosophy of Religion: Approaches from Continental Philosophy, ed. Philip Goodchild (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 45.
48John D. Caputo, “Introduction: Who Comes After the God of Metaphysics?,” in The 
Religious, ed. John D. Caputo (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 2–3.
388 Faith and Philosophy
Before responding any further to Caputo, let us consider what he thinks 
differentiates CPR from APR.
We on the continental side of this divide have sworn off that sort of thing 
and taken our stand with the equally traditional objection to the ontotheo-
logical tradition, voiced in a prophetic counter-tradition that stretches from 
Paul to Pascal and Luther, and from Kierkegaard to the present. . . . The 
objectifying tendencies, the preoccupation with cognitive certainty, the con-
fusion of the religious life with assenting to certain propositions, prove to be 
almost completely irrelevant to anyone with the least experience of religious 
matters, which beg to be treated differently and on their own terms. . . . The 
God of the traditional philosophy of religion is a philosopher’s God expli-
cating a philosopher’s faith, to be found, if anywhere, only on the pages of 
philosophy journals, not in the hearts of believers or the practice of faith.49
I think these passages can be explicated by focusing on three aspects:
The first is one that I dealt with in the previous section on thaumazein: 
namely, “objectifying tendencies” and “cognitive certainty.” I take it that 
most philosophers have sworn off of the foundationalist project (or what-
ever one would like to call it), so apodictic certainty is off the table for both 
APR and CPR. Where exactly one lands after giving up absolute certainty 
is going to be a matter of disagreement. I do not intend to adjudicate this 
debate here, but I will note that there is nothing like a consensus among 
practitioners of APR or CPR on this matter. The same goes with objecti-
fying tendencies: how cut and dried we think phenomena are—how well 
they can be reduced to logical propositions in the early Wittengensteinian 
sense—is again going to be a matter of some disagreement among prac-
titioners of both APR and CPR. It is not clear to me that simply because 
one uses numbered propositions or symbolic logic that one has thereby 
objectified God.
The second point—that the God found “in the hearts of believers” is 
not the God found in the pages of philosophy journals—is less easy to 
dispatch. Caputo is clearly trading on the distinction between the “god 
of the philosophers” and “the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob”—or the 
God of faith. But what really is the charge here? Certainly it can’t simply 
be that practitioners of APR write journal articles and practitioners of CPR 
do not. Instead, I think it has to be that the God of CPR is concrete and 
found “in the hearts of believers,” whereas the God of APR is not. But is 
this really true? Here the real issue is whether practitioners of APR are 
speaking to believers or writing for academic professionals. As for CPR, 
it is not very difficult to make the case that practitioners of CPR tend to 
write in ways—and on topics—that are seen by readers as having a pur-
chase on their personal lives. Earlier, we saw that Nussbaum points out 
that the therapeutic strategies of the Hellenistic philosophers are indeed 
philosophical arguments which have a certain sort of rigor. If we take 
Kierkegaard’s existential argument for the existence of God and the truth 
49Ibid.
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of Christianity, many people think that it has a certain kind of force. De-
pending on what one thinks of the value of the traditional proofs for God, 
one might find Kierkegaard’s argument much more convincing. But one 
does so in an existential way that is certainly rational (I don’t want to say 
it is something other than “reason” at work here), but rational not in the 
sense of theoria but of phronesis. It appeals to us in the sense of practical 
wisdom as in “you’d be a fool not to believe in God.” Actually, this is not 
too far from the argument that Pascal makes, but I’ll leave that point aside. 
In such a case, no small part of that convincing nature would be that it 
is a person-related argument in that it has a personal rather than merely 
theoretical force.50
Yet here we come to a significant problem. I cannot speak for practitio-
ners of APR, but presumably they find the kinds of arguments that Caputo 
says that CPR has “sworn off” significant. As it turns out, in many cases 
practitioners of APR are writing for fellow academics who are also believers. 
Of course, the extent to which their own belief is based on those kinds of 
arguments is somewhat more difficult to discern. Once, when a student 
was visiting my class, I made a joke about Billy Graham not having used 
the ontological argument in his crusades. She immediately replied that a 
friend of hers had become a Christian precisely because of the ontological 
argument. I responded: “well, then you have a really weird friend, for most 
people do not become Christians by reading the ontological argument.” I 
may simply be wrong here, of course. Perhaps there are far more people 
whose faith is based on the classic arguments than I imagine. But, if that is 
the case, then Caputo is not quite correct, which opens us the possibility 
that perhaps the classic arguments, the objections to evil, and the analysis 
of the divine attributes can be therapeutic after all. Whether they serve to 
bring people to the faith is something I will leave as an open question. But 
perhaps they have very significant therapeutic effects for those who are 
already believers and find that their faith is strengthened. Or perhaps we 
might better say that, for many in APR, their belief would be weakened if 
they found the classic arguments of no value, for instance.51 Of course, 
these therapeutic effects may be limited to some degree. Plantinga notes 
that “neither a Free Will Defense nor a Free Will Theodicy is designed to 
be of much help or comfort to one suffering from such a storm in the soul” 
but then concludes that “neither is intended for that purpose.”52
Yet one can come at this from another angle. While there are philoso-
phers who have been particularly successful at speaking personally and 
to a broad audience (Cornel West comes to mind), it is not as if “serious” 
analytic philosophers cannot speak in a personal and therapeutic ways. 
50For a more extended discussion of this subject, see J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis 
Benson, The New Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
chap. 7.
51I am indebted to Tom Flint for this point.
52Alvin Plantinga, The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader, ed. James F. Sennett 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 26.
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Let me provide a couple of examples. Looking through one of the “stan-
dard anthologies” on philosophy of religion (the ones that Messer takes 
to be thoroughly Swinburnean), one finds a chapter on “Faith, Hope, and 
Doubt” by Jay Wood and another on “Prayer” by Charles Taliaferro. I 
could cite more chapters like these, but I think these are enough evidence 
that APR is not necessarily about some “abstract God.”53 Or, for another 
example, consider what Plantinga says in Warranted Christian Belief: he 
speaks of the “testimonial model,” in which faith is the result of the Holy 
Spirit at work in believers’ hearts. He specifically contrasts the “belief” of 
the demons (James 2:19) with that of Christian believers. Plantinga points 
out that the difference between a demon and a believer is one’s affections. 
It is not insignificant that he also cites Luther as being on his side.54 I could 
go on, but I think the point is clear enough.
And that leads me to my conclusion. Given the trajectory of my remarks 
about the two ways of being a philosopher in Aristotle, perhaps these two 
ways themselves need to be examined more closely. We have seen that 
Aristotle distinguishes between two ways of being a philosopher. One 
way is more contemplative. The contemplative philosopher is particularly 
concerned with the intellectual virtues and with theoria. Such a philoso-
pher is inclined, on Aristotle’s view, to work on questions of physics, logic, 
and what we today call epistemology and metaphysics. Not surprisingly, 
such work tends to be theoretical. This is true for Aristotle’s work in these 
areas and has been, at least on the whole, true for the tradition of western 
philosophy. The other way of doing philosophy tends much more toward 
matters of practice. But we have already seen that the interpenetration 
of theoria with phronesis makes any simple distinction here untenable. 
Perhaps, then, these two ways of being a philosopher could actually be 
borne out in the same person. That is not to say that some philosophers 
are going to be more like the classic contemplatives and others are going 
to be active—perhaps even “activists”—but there need be no clear divi-
sion between them. If that is the case, the worst that we can say about the 
distinction between APR and CPR is that it represents a different division 
of labor. The one is not more important than the other (even if each “side” 
tends to think this way regarding itself). But that is the worst-case sce-
nario. A better vision would be that we are engaged in a common project 
to which we are all contributors in different ways. And, if I’m right about 
APR and CPR, this engagement is not only important to the philosophical 
way of life but to Christian identity and calling.
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